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Voluntary pledges to make intellectual property broadly available to address urgent public
health crises can overcome administrative and legal hurdles faced by more elaborate legal
arrangements such as patent pools and achieve greater acceptance than governmental
compulsory licensing.
Intellectual property rights (IPR) — patents, copyrights and similar forms of legal
protection — relate to virtually every aspect of the COVID-19 response, from vaccines,
diagnostics and therapeutics to medical equipment, tracking systems, software apps and other
innovations1,2. Traditionally, IPR offers the developers of new technologies the exclusive right to
exploit their innovations while recouping R&D and other expenditures. But IPR also gives its
owners the ability to stop others from conducting research as well as manufacturing and
distributing products.
During the current COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, we and others have observed
instances in which IPR restrictions, and even fear and uncertainty around IPR, have hindered
effective research on vaccines and therapies as well as the development, manufacturing and
distribution of ventilators, testing kits, protective equipment and other medical supplies
(referred to as “crisis critical products”1).
COVID-19 differs from other recent public health crises — cancer, HIV/AIDS, Ebola,
malaria, malnutrition — with respect to its sudden onset, its rapid spread, the lack of any
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known vaccine or cure and resulting shortages of critical medical equipment. The convergence
of these factors has prompted both governments and IPR holders around the world to seek
ways to increase the availability of IPR necessary to combat the pandemic. Governmental
compulsory licensing, IPR pools and voluntary IPR pledges have all been used in the past,
though in situations that differ in important respects from the COVID-19 pandemic. Each is
designed to result, to a greater or lesser degree, in a publicly-accessible “commons” of rights
and technologies that are broadly available for use to support an important public health goal3.
Here, we compare and contrast these differing approaches to IPR commons formation and
assess their suitability to address the COVID-19 crisis.
Voluntary pledges
A growing number of organizations have publicly committed to make their IPR freely
available in the fight against COVID-19. These IPR “pledges” take various forms and have
different labels, but share a common lineage that extends back to commitments made for
decades by technology firms to support the use of interoperability standards, open software
and emerging technology platforms4,5. As such, these pledges and the licenses that are
associated with them are irrevocable once granted and legally enforceable under precedents
that have been recognized in jurisdictions around the world4.
As seen in Table 1, there are several varieties of IPR pledges4,6,7. Some cover different
types of IPR (patents, copyrights, designs, etc.) and can impose different restrictions and
limitations (e.g., duration, field of use). IPR pledges can be made unilaterally by a single
organization (e.g., Medtronic, AbbVie) or through coordinated efforts of organizations that
commit to the same basic terms (e.g., Wellcome Trust Publishers’ Pledge, Open COVID Pledge).
Some, like the Open COVID Pledge, which was developed by a coalition of scientists, engineers
and legal experts (including the authors), are self-executing, inasmuch as any interested
organization is automatically granted the right to use the licensed IPR without further
paperwork. Others, like the Harvard-MIT-Stanford (HMS) pledge, provide a framework but still
require organizations that wish to use pledged IPR to negotiate a separate license agreement
with the IPR holder.
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Some unilateral pledges, such as the one made by equipment manufacturer Medtronic,
cover not only formal IPR, but also data files and designs for equipment and parts, which are
often essential when manufacturing such devices. This pledge, like that made by
pharmaceutical manufacturer AbbVie, is limited to a particular product (a ventilator in the case
of Medtronic, a drug in the case of AbbVie). While these pledges are narrower than open-ended
pledges covering all of an organization’s IPR, their specificity makes their application to
particular technologies clear, which enables usability. It may be more difficult for potential
users to determine how they can use IPR that is licensed on a broad but nonspecific basis8.
The Medtronic pledge also adopts a ‘share alike’ feature, borrowed from the well-known GNU
General Public License (GPL) and certain Creative Commons licenses, which require that the
user of pledged IPR make its modifications and improvements openly available on the same
terms as the pledged IPR. Such provisions are intended to prevent the users of freely licensed
IPR from making proprietary improvements to that IPR to gain a competitive advantage over
the pledgor. Protective measures like these could be particularly important when competitors
are required to cooperate to supply crisis-critical products.
Like the Wellcome Trust Publishers’ Pledge for copyrighted material, the Open COVID
Pledge was not developed by a particular IPR owner, but as a neutral mechanism for adoption
by an unlimited number of IPR owners. Organizations adopting the Open COVID Pledge can
utilize a template license that was developed by the coalition or customize one of their own.
These customizations can more specifically detail the IPR pledged, the duration of the license,
and specific limitations that may be required by law or prior agreements that bind the IPR
owner. Since its launch, the Open COVID Pledge has been adopted by organizations large and
small, holding in excess of 250,000 patents worldwide. The similar Japan-based Open COVID-19
Declaration boasts 96 signatories that have pledged close to one million patents. Industry
sectors most heavily represented by these pledges include computing, telecommunications,
social media, software, equipment, automotive and chemicals.
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Pledging and pricing
Despite their variations, all of the IPR pledges described above share a key feature: they
enable users, typically anywhere in the world, to use the pledged IPR without the threat of
litigation, and to do so for free for at least some period. Though royalty-free pledges do not
generate immediate monetary compensation for IPR holders, they are not economically
irrational. While the IPR owner necessarily foregoes direct revenue associated with the use of
its IPR, it only does so for a limited period (the duration of the pandemic and one year
thereafter) and has the ability to negotiate fee-bearing licenses after that period and in fields
other than COVID-19.
Previous scholarship has identified a range of motivations that lead IPR holders to make
their IPR available for broad use without compensation, including accelerating diffusion of an
emerging technology, seeking favor with governmental agencies and courts, enhancing public
relations and acting in accordance with corporate social responsibility and philanthropic
goals4,7,9. IPR pledges that have been made in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic likely
fall into several of these categories.
Some IPR owners might be concerned that users of their pledged IPR will charge
excessive prices for resulting products, which is not in the spirit of either their pledge or societal
expectations in the current pandemic crisis. In order to prevent this behavior, some of the
above-mentioned pledges, such as the HMS university pledge and Oxford University’s pledge,
require that users charge “fair” or no more than “cost-plus” prices for resulting products. The
Open COVID Pledge, on the other hand, does not contain such user pricing clauses, as the
designers were concerned that such a constraint could deter some producers from using the
pledged IPR in a setting where the widespread distribution of needed products and services is
paramount.
Pledges versus pools
In addition to the IPR pledges discussed above, proposals have been made, both at the
United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) and within the European Union, for the
assembly of IPR relating to COVID-19 in one or more formal IPR pools. Whereas a coordinated
4
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pledge is a joint initiative of multiple organizations to share their IPR on similar terms, an IPR
pool is typically a private arrangement among IPR owners to operate under one another’s IPR,
to manage and administer it through a centralized mechanism, and often to license it to third
parties, with proceeds allocated among the pool participants according to an agreed formula.
IPR pools have been formed for nearly a century in industries ranging from aviation and
semiconductors to copyrighted music and performances. One of the major advantages of pools
is the consolidation of complementary IPR rights into a single source, overcoming problems of
fragmentation and “thickets” that can arise with respect to diversely held IPR3.
IPR pools were actively considered in response to the SARS outbreak of 2002–03, the
H5N1 influenza outbreak of 2005, and the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 200910,11. Yet despite a
perceived need for aggregation of distributed IPR rights, pools, which generally require complex
and coordinated negotiations among IPR owners, were never formed in these cases for a
variety of practical, financial and competitive reasons10,11.
In the case of COVID-19, the precise contours of proposed pooling efforts have not yet
been announced. One potential model is the WHO’s Medicines Patent Pool (MPP). MPP is not
technically an IPR pool. Rather, it serves as an intermediary or clearinghouse to which
organizations can license IPR relating to HIV, tuberculosis and hepatitis C. MPP then negotiates
outbound sublicenses (sometimes royalty-bearing) with generic drug manufacturers serving
low-income countries. To date, several significant IPR holders including AbbVie, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Gilead Sciences and Pfizer have granted royalty-free licenses to MPP, which has in turn
granted 22 sublicenses to generic product manufacturers (http://medicinespatentpool.org).
While the goals of such government-sponsored arrangements are consistent with those
of the IPR pledges, they generally require greater time, financial backing and political willpower
to implement than the lightweight and self-executing mechanisms inherent to pledges. And in a
time of pandemic, when every day counts, the voluntary pledging approaches discussed here
can serve as useful complements to more formalized government-driven arrangements. This
being said, passive pledges that lack ongoing stewardship and active efforts to match users with
pledged IPR have been shown in the past to underperform8. Thus, programs such as the Open
COVID Pledge, which is administered and hosted by Creative Commons, have sought to
5
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implement outreach strategies both with respect to IPR holders and potential users of pledged
IPR.
Pledges versus compulsory licensing
In addition to the voluntary mechanisms described above, some governments have
threatened or taken action to authorize the use of privately held IPR without the consent of the
owners. Such compulsory licensing approaches are well known mechanisms with established
legal frameworks under national law and international treaty. In the current crisis they have
already been enacted in Canada, Israel, Germany, Chile and Ecuador, with active discussions
elsewhere12. While such measures can address health needs within the countries enacting
them, they have limited effectiveness on a global scale, particularly if major countries like the
United States and China decline to follow suit. However, this is exactly the scale on which IPR
access is needed during the current COVID-19 crisis.
Moreover, compulsory measures are typically opposed by IPR owners, decreasing the
likelihood of meaningful cooperation or knowledge transfer among IPR owners and users. And
as shown elsewhere, such cooperation above and beyond passive licenses of IPR may be
important to the effective deployment of complex technologies for crisis-critical products8,13.
Indeed, the threat of compulsory licensing and other governmental action has seemingly
encouraged some companies to make broader, global pledges. One example of this effect may
be AbbVie, which announced the public availability of IPR covering its patented HIV drug Kaletra
shortly after the Israeli government authorized generic manufacture of the drug.14
Pledges versus the public domain
IPR pledges occupy a legal middle ground between the full exclusivity afforded by the
law and an outright contribution to the public domain. Like open source code software
licenses, IPR pledges coupled with license agreements enable the IPR owner to retain some
degree of control over the IPR in question. Most importantly, many of the pledges described
above last for limited periods of time (i.e., during the pandemic and for a short period
thereafter) and apply only to limited fields of use (i.e., addressing COVID-19). This limited scope
6
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is important, as many medical and other technologies used to combat COVID-19 have other
applications, and it is unlikely that for-profit firms would be willing to relinquish all markets for
their products as a condition to contributing to the fight against COVID-19. Moreover, if a user
develops a useful product based on pledged IPR, then it will have an incentive to seek a
commercial license from the IPR owner if it wishes to continue to market that product after the
pandemic. In addition, some pledges, such as the Open COVID Pledge, allow for “defensive
suspension” of the licenses granted. That is, if a pledgor is sued for patent infringement, it may
suspend any licenses that it previously granted to the aggressor. Thus, while the contribution of
IPR to the public domain achieves many of the same access goals as IPR pledges, it can be a less
attractive option for commercial entities.
Conclusions
While IPR aims to reward innovators for technological developments, it can also become
a barrier to rapid and efficient collective action in the face of an urgent public health
emergency. While more draconian measures have been suggested to eliminate IPR barriers to
research and manufacturing of products essential to the fight against COVID-19 (e.g.,
compulsory licensing), a less onerous path involves voluntary pledges made by IPR holders.
Such pledges — temporary in duration and narrow in scope — can enable critical public health
research and manufacturing of crisis-critical products, while at the same time preserving for
their owners the prospect of financial rewards and influence over markets after the pandemic
ends. By the same token, such pledges are lightweight and efficient, avoiding the
administrative, legal and political delays that have hindered prior pooling proposals in response
to public health emergencies.
Nevertheless, the lightweight, self-executing and sometimes broad nature of pledges
could challenge users seeking to find specific pledged IP without ongoing stewardship and
active assessment of the rights being made available. Although the full economic and health
implications of ongoing IPR pledges may take time to be appreciated fully, we recommend that,
with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments encourage, and possibly incentivize, the
voluntary pledging mechanisms described here.
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This being said, the profile of organizations that have made IPR pledges in the current
pandemic has been uneven. While there has been significant representation by the technology
and equipment sectors, comparatively little voluntary action has been taken to date with
respect to IPR covering vaccines or therapeutics (with a few exceptions such as AbbVie’s
unilateral pledge of Kaletra and pledges by some Japanese chemical firms with pharmaceutical
divisions). Simple economic forces may be at work here, as firms that anticipate a direct and
significant windfall from the sale of COVID-19 products may be less inclined to commit their IPR
to the public cause, or to make it available to their competitors. In these cases, governmental
compulsory licensing may be the only realistic mechanism for making IPR broadly available.
Moreover, if society wishes to incentivize the discovery of new treatments for COVID-19 (as
opposed to the repurposing of existing ones), it is not clear that compulsory licensing will result
in the greatest level of private innovation. Thus, for some sectors of the economy, biopharma in
particular, neither pledges nor compulsory licensing may achieve optimal results.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, countless technologies from outside the biopharma
sector are critical to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic — emergency response, medical
equipment, diagnostic kits, protective gear, software modeling, social distancing and many
more. To the extent that these technologies can be made broadly available and accessible
through voluntary IPR pledges, we believe that the effort to combat the pandemic and to
mitigate its effects will be helped immeasurably.
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Table 1 Selected IPR pledges in response to COVID-19*
IPR holder
Unilateral pledges
AbbVie

Fortress and
Labrador
Diagnostics
SMITHs Group
UC Berkeley IGI
Medtronic

Oxford University

Pledge
date

IPR pledged

Separate
license
required?

User restrictions/obligations

9 March
2020

Patents on
Kaletra/Aluvia HIV
antiviral drug
Patented
diagnostics
technology
PARAPAC Plus
lightweight
ventilators
New technology
related to COVID19
Puritan Bennett
560 Ventilator
design materials
and software
COVID-19 related
IPR
IPR in COVID-19
data sets

No

None

No

Unknown

Unknown

Only available to members of UK
Ventilator Challenge Consortium

Yes

Unknown

No

Share-alike requirement for
modifications

17
March
2020
21
March
2020
29
March
2020
30
March
2020
8 April
2020
April
2020

Allen Institute for
AI
Coordinated pledges
Wellcome Trust
16
Publishers’
March
Pledge**
2020
Open COVID
Pledge***
Harvard-MITStanford (HMS)
Open COVID-19
Declaration****

7 April
2020
7 April
2020
7 May
2020

All publications
relating to COVID19 and
coronavirus
Patents and/or
copyrights
All IPR
Patents, utility
models, designs,
copyrights

No

User registration/identification
Resulting products must be offered free
of charge, at cost or cost-plus
None

No

None

No

Defensive suspension of license if
licensee asserts patents against licensor
Fair pricing of resulting products and
services
None

Yes

Yes
No

*All pledges are archived at http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/. **As of 29 May 2020,
includes 30 publishers of scientific journals and proceedings, including American Chemical Society,
American Physical Society, British Medical Journal, Cell Press, Elsevier, Karger, Lancet, New England
Journal of Medicine, Public Library of Science, Royal Society, Science Journals, Springer Nature, Taylor &
Francis, Wiley and Wolters Kluwer. ***As of 24 August 2020, includes 30 companies and institutions
including Amazon, AT&T, Facebook, Fujitsu, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, IBM, Intel, Microsoft,
Mitsubishi Electric, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Sandia National
Laboratory and Uber, among others. ****As of 24 August 2020, includes 96 Japanese industrial firms.
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